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We contribute to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing rank-
discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism (RDCLU). Population ethics
is needed for evaluation of policies, e.g., concerning climate change, where pop-
ulation size depends on the chosen policy. We show that critical-level generalized
utilitarianism and (a version of) critical-level leximin are the limits of RDCLU for
extreme values of the rank utility discount factor. Moreover, we establish how
RDCLU avoids serious objections raised against other variable population crite-
ria. In particular, it escapes both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadistic
Conclusion (while critical-level generalized utilitarianism leads to one of these
undesirable conclusions for any critical level).
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1. Introduction
Emission of greenhouse gases may prevent the existence of a great many people who
would otherwise have existed, as the earth will not be able to sustain anything approach-
ing our present population if there is extreme climate change (Broome 2010). How
should we take into account the loss of such potential lives when evaluating policies
designed to abate greenhouse gas emissions?
Practical evaluation of climate polices in integrated assessment models, like versions
of Nordhaus’ Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE model,
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Nordhaus 2008), usually applies the time-discounted utilitarian criterion, implying that
insignificant weight is assigned to people living centuries from now. Since serious cli-
mate change will, in particular, reduce population size in the far future, accounting for
loss of potential lives is not of great concern under time-discounted utilitarianism.
However, if one instead denounces such deviation from the ideal of equal treatment
of all individuals, then the issue of losing potential lives, even many generations from
now, becomes much more pressing. If we endorse Broome’s (2004) position that one
cannot simply ignore the effects on population size when evaluating climate policies,
while maintaining that all individuals be treated equally, what kind of evaluation crite-
rion should we use?
One prominent response is to assume that there exists a critical level of lifetime well-
being which, if experienced by an added individual without changing the well-being lev-
els of the existing population, leads to an alternative that is as good as the original. This
critical level may differ from the (individually) neutral level of well-being, above which
a life is worth living and below which it is not. Combined with a generalized utilitar-
ian criterion where, for fixed population size, the undiscounted sum of the individuals’
(transformed) utilities is maximized, the idea of a critical level leads to critical-level gen-
eralized utilitarianism (Broome 2004, Blackorby et al. 2005).
The standard objections to critical-level generalized utilitarianism are the following:
• If we set the critical level at (or below) the individually neutral well-being level,
then we get the Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit 1976, 1982, 1984) where, for any
population with excellent lives, there is a population with lives barely worth living
that is better, provided that the latter includes sufficiently many people,
• If we set the critical level strictly above the individually neutral well-being level,
then we get the Very Sadistic Conclusion (Arrhenius 2000, forthcoming) where, for
any population with terrible lives not worth living, there is a population with good
lives that is worse, provided that the latter includes sufficiently many people.
There are other criteria that avoid the Repugnant and Very Sadistic Conclusions, but
they all have their own serious shortcomings. According to average generalized utilitari-
anism, the contributive value of a life can vary in all respects: a life worth living can have
negative contributive value and a life not worth living can have positive contributive
value. According to critical-level leximin, as defined by Blackorby et al. (1996), any pop-
ulation with excellent lives is worse than a population with one added individual even
when the well-being of all the individuals in the latter population is barely above the crit-
ical level. According to critical-level leximin, as suggested by Arrhenius (forthcoming,
Section 6.8) and defined in Section 2 of the present paper (Definition 5), any popula-
tion is worse than a population consisting of one individual, provided that the worst-off
individual of the former has lower well-being than the single individual of the latter.
Even in a fixed population framework, where there is no difference between the var-
ious generalized utilitarian criteria discussed above and also no difference between the
two kinds of leximin criteria, both generalized utilitarianism and leximin have short-
comings if there are many present and future people. If one considers a completely
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egalitarian well-being stream in an intergenerational setting with many future gener-
ations and seeks to evaluate whether the present generation should make a sacrifice
leading to a uniform benefit of all future generations, then generalized utilitarianism
and leximin reach opposite and extreme conclusions: According to generalized utilitari-
anism, the sacrifice should always be made provided that there are sufficiently many fu-
ture generations, while according to leximin, it should never be made (cf. Asheim 2010,
Section 4.3).
As a response, Zuber and Asheim (2012) have proposed and axiomatized the rank-
discounted generalized utilitarian social welfare order where the weights assigned to
(transformed) utility are discounted according to rank, not according to time as in the
time-discounted utilitarian criterion. Such rank discounting is solely an expression of
inequality aversion and is, therefore, consistent with equal treatment. Still, it allows for
a trade-off between the present and the future in the conflict described in the previ-
ous paragraph and leads to the same consequences as time-discounted utilitarianism if
well-being is perfectly correlated with time. However, if a future generation is expected
to be worse off compared to the present, e.g., due to climate change, then that less fortu-
nate future generation will not be assigned less utility weight than the present according
to rank-discounted utilitarianism. It will actually receive strictly more utility weight pro-
vided there are not infinitely many even worse-off generations. Here we show how the
rank-discounted generalized utilitarian approach can fruitfully be extended to the vari-
able population framework. In particular, it avoids shortcomings like the Repugnant
and Very Sadistic Conclusions.
In Section 2, we propose the rank-discounted critical level generalized utilitarian
(RDCLU) social welfare order (Definition 1). As is the case for Ng’s (1989) theory X and
Sider’s (1991) principle GV, an RDCLU social welfare order is a variable value principle,
in the sense that the value of an egalitarian population does not change affinely with
population size, and is a context sensitive theory, in the sense that the contributive value
of a life depends on the well-being of the rest of the population. However, in contrast to
Ng’s theory X, the value of each individual depends on its rank, and in contrast to Sider’s
principle GV, the values are assigned in a prioritarian manner. Then, in Section 3, we
provide an axiomatic foundation and show how critical-level generalized utilitarianism
(Definition 2) and critical-level leximin (as defined in Definition 5) are the limits of an
RDCLU social welfare order for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor.
In Section 4, we present many of the conclusions and principles used to evaluate
variable population criteria (cf. Arrhenius forthcoming) and establish how the RDCLU
social welfare order avoids the serious objections raised against other variable popula-
tion criteria. In particular, it escapes both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadis-
tic Conclusion (while critical-level generalized utilitarianism leads to one of these unde-
sirable conclusions for any critical level), it never assigns positive contributive value to
a life not worth living (in contrast to average generalized utilitarianism), and it avoids
the Weak Repugnant and Reverse Repugnant Conclusions (which are the conclusions
that, in more extreme versions, the two kinds of critical-level leximin lead to). The key
intuition is that, with an RDCLU social welfare order, the cumulative effect of adding
individuals at a given level of lifetime well-being is bounded.
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Finally, in Section 5, we illustrate in the context of a simple model of optimal popu-
lation size how the RDCLU social welfare order leads to a smaller population size than
critical-level generalized utilitarianism and, in Section 6, note that the problem of ac-
commodating uncertainty still remains. Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2. Framework and definitions
Let N denote the natural numbers, let R denote the real numbers, and let, respec-
tively, R+/R++/R−/R−− denote the nonnegative/positive/nonpositive/negative real
numbers. Let X=⋃n∈NRn be the set of possible finite allocations of lifetime well-being.
For every n ∈ N, each allocation x ∈ Rn determines the finite population size, n(x) = n,
and the distribution of well-being, x = (x1     xn(x)), among the n(x) individuals that
make up the population. This framework suffices, as the binary relations we consider
do not depend on the identities of the individuals. Following the usual convention in
population ethics, lifetime well-being equal to 0 represents neutrality. Hence, lifetime
well-being is normalized so that above neutrality, a life, as a whole, is worth living; below
neutrality, it is not.
A social welfare relation (SWR) on the set X is a binary relation , where for all
xy ∈ X, x  y implies that the allocation x is deemed socially at least as good as y. Let
∼ and  denote the symmetric and asymmetric parts of . A complete, reflexive, and
transitive SWR is called a social welfare order (SWO).
For each x ∈ X, let x[ ] = (x[1]     x[r]     x[n(x)]) denote the nondecreasing alloca-
tion that is a reordering of x; i.e., for each rank r ∈ {1     n(x) − 1}, x[r] ≤ x[r+1]. Even
though the permutation that turns x into x[ ] need not be uniquely determined if differ-
ent individuals have the same lifetime well-being, the resulting rank-ordered allocation,
x[ ], is uniquely determined.
For every n ∈ N and all xy ∈ Rn, write x[ ] ≥ y[ ] whenever x[r] ≥ y[r] for all r ∈
{1     n(x)}, and write x[ ] > y[ ] whenever x[ ] ≥ y[ ] and x[ ] = y[ ]. Let (z)n ∈ Rn denote
the egalitarian allocation where all n individual have lifetime well-being equal to z. Let
(x z) denote x ∈ X with one added individual with lifetime well-being equal to z ∈ R.
Let (x (z)n) denote x ∈ X with n added individuals, all with lifetime well-being equal to
z ∈R.
We now introduce the SWO proposed, axiomatized, and analyzed in this paper.
Definition 1. An SWR on X is a rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian
(RDCLU) SWO if there exist c ∈R+, β ∈ (01), and a continuous and increasing function
u :R→R such that, for all xy ∈ X,
x y ⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βr(u(y[r])− u(c))
This is a generalized utilitarian criterion, as the function u turns lifetime well-being
into transformed values. We refer to the transformed values as utility and refer to β as
a rank utility discount factor to be consistent with the literature on intertemporal social
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choice. The term “rank-discounted” reflects that the utility weights are not merely rank-
dependent, but are discounted according to rank by a geometrically decaying function.
This is analogous to the use of “time-discounted utilities,” rather than “time-dependent
utilities,” in the time-discounted utilitarian criterion of intertemporal social choice. We
refer to c as a critical-level parameter.
We now define established generalized utilitarian SWOs of population ethics.
Definition 2. An SWR  on X is a critical-level generalized utilitarian (CLU) SWO if
there exist c ∈ R+ and a continuous and increasing function u :R→ R such that, for all
xy ∈ X,
x y ⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
(u(y[r])− u(c))
The CLU SWO has been proposed, discussed, and axiomatized in Blackorby and
Donaldson (1984) and Blackorby et al. (1995, 2005). The CLU SWO with c = 0 is referred
to as the total generalized utilitarian (TU) SWO.
Definition 3. An SWR  on X is an average generalized utilitarian (AU) SWO if there
exists a continuous and increasing function u :R→R such that, for all xy ∈ X,
x y ⇔ 1
n(x)
n(x)∑
r=1
u(x[r])≥ 1
n(y)
n(y)∑
r=1
u(y[r])
The AU SWO is not affected by how u(0) is normalized and thus is not affected by the
introduction of a critical-level parameter c either.
Definition 4. An SWR on X is a number-dampened critical-level generalized utilitar-
ian (NDCLU) SWO if there exist c ∈ R+, a function f :N → R++, and a continuous and
increasing function u :R→R such that, for all xy ∈ X,
x y ⇔ f (n(x))
n(x)
n(x)∑
r=1
(u(x[r])− u(c))≥ f (n(y))
n(y)
n(y)∑
r=1
(u(y[r])− u(c))
The NDCLU SWO was introduced in the case with c = 0 by Ng (1989). It encompasses
both the CLU SWO when f (n) = n for all n ∈ N, and the AU SWO when f (n) = 1 for all
n ∈N.
Last, we state a version of a leximin SWO.
Definition 5. An SWR on X is a critical-level leximin (CLL) SWO if there exists c ∈R+
such that, for all xy ∈ X with n(x)≥ n(y), the following statements hold:
(a) x∼ y if and only if (x[1]     x[n(y)])= y[ ] and (x[n(y)+1]     x[n(x)])= (c)n(x)−n(y).
(b) x  y if and only if (i) there exists R ∈ {1     n(y)} such that x[r] = y[r] for all
r ∈ {1    R − 1} and x[R] > y[R] or (ii) (x[1]     x[n(y)]) = y[ ] and (x[n(y)+1]    
x[n(x)]) > (c)n(x)−n(y).
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The CLL SWO was suggested by Arrhenius (forthcoming, Section 6.8). It differs, in
comparisons of allocations with different population sizes, from the critical-level lex-
imin SWO proposed and axiomatized by Blackorby et al. (1996).1
3. Axioms and representation results
Rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism can be characterized by the
following seven axioms. The first three axioms are sufficient to ensure numerical rep-
resentation for any fixed population size, and entail that individuals are treated anony-
mously and with sensitivity for their well-being.
Axiom 1 (Order). The relation  is complete, reflexive, and transitive on X.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all n ∈N and x ∈Rn, the sets {y ∈Rn :y x} and {y ∈Rn :x y}
are closed.
Axiom 3 (Suppes–Sen). For all n ∈N and xy ∈Rn, if x[ ] > y[ ], then x y.
While ordinary critical-level generalized utilitarianism allows for unrestricted inde-
pendence to adding an individual (see Blackorby et al. 2005), our axioms impose such
independence only if the added individual is best off (relative to two allocations with the
same population size) or worst off.
Axiom 4 (Existence independence of the best off). For all n ∈ N, xy ∈ Rn, and z ∈ R
satisfying z ≥max{x[n] y[n]}, (x z) (y z) if and only if x y.
Axiom 5 (Existence independence of the worst off). For all xy ∈ X and z ∈ R satisfying
z ≤min{x[1] y[1]}, (x z) (y z) if and only if x y.
In the spirit of critical-level generalized utilitarianism, we introduce a critical life-
time well-being c ∈ R+, which if experienced by an added individual without changing
the utilities of the existing population, leads to an alternative that is as good as the orig-
inal. However, the following axiom imposes this if xn(x) ≤ c, not otherwise. Note that c is
at least as large as neutral lifetime well-being.
Axiom 6 (Existence of a critical level). There exist c ∈ R+ and n ∈ N such that, for all
x ∈Rn satisfying x[n] ≤ c, (x c)∼ x.
All axioms above are satisfied also by ordinary critical-level generalized utilitar-
ianism. However, as mentioned in the Introduction and discussed by Arrhenius
(forthcoming, Section 5.1), the CLU SWO leads to the Repugnant Conclusion if c = 0
(adding sufficiently many individuals with lifetime well-being just above 0 makes the
1Their critical-level leximin SWO is defined as follows: For all xy ∈ X with n(x)≥ n(y) (where y˜ denotes
(y (c)n(x)−n(y))), (a) x∼ y if and only if x[ ] = y˜[ ], and (b) x y if and only if there exists R ∈ {1     n(x)} such
that x[r] = y˜[r] for all r ∈ {1    R− 1} and x[R] > y˜[R].
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allocation better than any fixed alternative) and leads to the Very Sadistic Conclusion if
c > 0 (adding sufficiently many individuals with positive lifetime well-being just below
c makes the allocation worse than any fixed alternative). Both conclusions rely on the
property that adding individuals at a given utility level has unbounded importance. One
may consider this property too extreme and rather impose through the following axiom
that this need not be the case.
Axiom 7 (Existence of egalitarian equivalence). For all xy ∈ X, if x y, then there exists
z ∈R such that, for allN ∈N, x (z)n  y for some n≥N .
Axiom 7 is the key axiom to avoiding the Repugnant and Very Sadistic Conclusions,
while not by itself contradicting these conclusions; thus it is weaker than directly requir-
ing avoidance of the conclusions. For instance, the NDCLU SWO with f (n)= 1 if n is odd
and f (n) = n if n is even satisfies Axiom 7 while leading to the Repugnant Conclusion if
c = 0 and to the Very Sadistic Conclusion if c > 0.
We now state the result (proven in the Appendix) that these seven axioms character-
ize the rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian SWO.
Theorem 1. Consider an SWR  on X. The following two statements are equivalent.
(i)  satisfies Axioms 1–7.
(ii)  is an RDCLU SWO.
It follows from the RDCLU SWO that c is the lifetime well-being that, if experienced
by an added individual without changing the utilities of the existing population, leads
to an alternative that is as good as the original only if x[n(x)] ≤ c. If x[n(x)] > c, then
there is a context-dependent critical level in the open interval (cx[n(x)]) that depends
on the well-being levels that exceed c. This follows from Definition 1, since adding an
individual with well-being equal to x[n(x)] increases welfare, while adding an individual
with well-being equal to c lowers the weights assigned to individuals at well-being levels
that exceed c and thereby reduces welfare.
We end this section by showing how any CLU and CLL SWO is the limit of an RDCLU
SWO for extreme values of the rank utility discount factor β. Writeβuc for the RDCLU
SWO characterized by β, u, and c, write uc for the CLU SWO characterized by u and
c, and write Lc for the CLL SWO characterized by c. The following result (proven in the
Appendix) establishes that for any nonnegative c and any increasing and continuous
function u, the CLU SWO uc is the limit of the RDCLU SWO βuc as β approaches
1, and the CLL SWO Lc is the limit of the RDCLU SWO βuc as β approaches 0. Note
that in the case of Lc , the weak preference of βuc for small β is both sufficient and
necessary.
Theorem 2. For any c ∈ R+, and any continuous and increasing function u, the follow-
ing results hold for any xy ∈ X:
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(i) xuc y if there exists β ∈ (01) such that, for all β ∈ (β1), xβuc y.
(ii) xLc y if and only if there exists β ∈ (01) such that for all β ∈ (0β), xβuc y.
The case where the rank-discount factor β approaches 0, and thereby an RDCLU
SWO approaches a CLL SWO, is related to the case where a given allocation is replicated
in the following sense: For any x ∈ X and any k ∈ N, the k-replica of x is an allocation
xk with kn(x) individuals having the property that x[r] = xk[ρ] for all r ∈ {1     n(x)} and
ρ ∈ {k(r − 1) + 1    kr}. Theorem 2 implies that for fixed xy ∈ X and β ∈ (01), there
exists K ∈ N such that for all k > K, xk βuc yk if and only if xLc y. Hence, as a given
allocation is replicated, utility weight is redistributed toward the individuals with lowest
lifetime well-being.
4. Evaluating RDCLU
We now compare the RDCLU SWO to other criteria by means of conditions used in the
literature on population ethics. In particular, we establish two results that show how
the RDCLU SWO compares favorably to the NDCLU SWO for any function f (cf. Defi-
nition 4). The conditions are referred to by the labels used by Arrhenius (forthcoming),
but are formulated here in a precise manner using the terminology of this paper.
According to Parfit (1976, 1982, 1984), an SWR leads to the Repugnant Conclusion if
for any egalitarian allocation with very high positive well-being, there is an egalitarian
allocation with very low positive well-being that is better.
An SWR  leads to the Repugnant Conclusion if, for all y z ∈ R with y > z > 0 and k ∈ N,
there is n > k such that (y)k ≺ (z)n.2
The TU SWO has been criticized for not avoiding this conclusion.
Besides, if c > 0, the CLU SWO is subject to the following weaker form of the Re-
pugnant Conclusion, namely that for any egalitarian allocation with very high positive
well-being, there is an egalitarian allocation with well-being just above the critical level
that is better:
An SWR  leads to the Weak Repugnant Conclusion if, for all y z ∈ R with y > z > c and
k ∈N, there is n > k such that (y)k ≺ (z)n.
As pointed out by Arrhenius (2000, forthcoming), the CLU SWO with c > 0 also leads
to the Very Sadistic Conclusion that, for any allocation with negative well-being, there is
an egalitarian allocation with positive well-being that is worse.
2This definition is equivalent to the one provided by Blackorby et al. (2005, p. 162). If one determines
disjoint nonempty intervals (0x] and [xh∞) with, respectively, very low and very high positive well-
being, then the Repugnant Conclusion might alternatively be defined as the property that, for all y ∈ [xh∞)
and k ∈ N, there are z ∈ (0x] and n > k such that (y)k ≺ (z)n. With this alternative definition, the CLU
SWO avoids the Repugnant Conclusion if c ≥ x, but not if c ∈ (0x), while the RDCLU SWO still avoids the
Repugnant Conclusion for all c ≥ 0 (just pick k large enough to ensure (1−βk)u(xh)≥ u(x)).
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An SWR  leads to the Very Sadistic Conclusion if, for all x ∈ X, there are z ∈R++ and n ∈N
such that x (z)n.
This follows since if 0 < z < c, then by choosing n sufficiently large, (z)n can be made
worse than any given allocation x, even when the individuals in x have very negative
lifetime well-being.
As an alternative to avoiding the Very Sadistic Conclusion, Arrhenius (forthcoming)
has also proposed the Weak Non-Sadism Condition:
An SWR  satisfies the Weak Non-Sadism Condition if there are y ∈ R−− and k ∈ N such
that for all x ∈ X, z ∈R++ and n ∈N, (x (y)k) (x (z)n).
The RDCLU avoids the Weak Repugnant Conclusion, even when c = 0, implying that
it also escapes the Repugnant Conclusion for all c ≥ 0. It also avoids the Very Sadistic
Conclusion and, provided that the function u is bounded above, satisfies the Weak Non-
Sadism Condition. This is in contrast to the large class of generalized utilitarian criteria
embodied in the NDCLU SWO: these criteria necessarily violate the Weak Non-Sadism
Condition or imply the Weak Repugnant Conclusion, as stated in the following result
(proven in the Appendix).
Proposition 1. (i) An NDCLU SWO either leads to the Weak Repugnant Conclusion or
violates the Weak Non-Sadism Condition, even when the function u is bounded
above.
(ii) An RDCLU SWO avoids the Weak Repugnant Conclusion and satisfies the Weak
Non-Sadism Condition, provided the function u is bounded above.
Being able to avoid the Weak Repugnant Conclusion while satisfying the Weak Non-
Sadism Condition, the RDCLU SWO is rather remarkable. The NDCLU SWO is indeed
one of the most general forms that have been proposed.3
Outside the class of generalized utilitarian criteria, Blackorby et al. (1996) have pro-
posed a critical-level leximin SWO (cf. footnote 1). It, however, leads to the following
more extreme version of the Weak Repugnant Conclusion: For all y z ∈R with y > z > c
and kn ∈ N with k < n, (y)k ≺ (z)n. Thus it does not escape the impossibility encoun-
tered by the NDCLU SWO.
A version of Proposition 1 that restricts attention to the more undesirable implica-
tions of variable population criteria—the Repugnant and Very Sadistic Conclusions—is
obtained if one adopts the following natural requirement (called Negative Expansion
Principle by Blackorby et al. 2005):
3A restricted number-dampened generalized utilitarian (RNDU) SWO is attributed to Thomas Hurka by
Blackorby et al. (2005). It is similar to the NDCLU SWO with c = 0, except that f (n)= n if average well-being
is negative. Considering the RNDU SWO would not alter our result, because the proof of Proposition 1
only involves streams with positive average well-being. Another family is number-sensitive critical-level
generalized utilitarianism (Blackorby et al. 2002, 2005). It is similar to the CLU except that the critical level
changes with population size. It leads to the Very Sadistic Conclusion and a modified version of the Weak
Repugnant Conclusion.
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An SWR  satisfies the Negative Mere Addition Principle if, for all x ∈ X and z ∈ R−−,
(x z)≺ x.
This property is satisfied by the RDCLU SWO, but not by some utilitarian criteria like the
AU SWO. And we have the following result (proven in the Appendix).
Proposition 2. (i) An NDCLU SWO satisfying the Negative Mere Addition Principle
leads either to the Repugnant Conclusion or to the Very Sadistic Conclusion.
(ii) An RDCLU SWO avoids the Repugnant Conclusion and the Very Sadistic Conclu-
sion, and satisfies the Negative Mere Addition Principle.
Contrary to Proposition 1, Proposition 2 does not depend on the function u being
bounded above for the RDCLU SWO to satisfy all desirable properties.
Besides the RDCLU SWO, the CLL SWO also avoids all the above shortcomings. How-
ever, the CLL SWO leads to the problematic conclusion that for any egalitarian alloca-
tion with very high positive well-being, there is a better one-individual allocation with
slightly higher well-being:
An SWR  leads to the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion if, for all y ∈ R++ and k ∈ N,
(y)k ≺ (z)1 if y < z.
This conclusion does not follow from the RDCLU SWO as
1−βk
1−β (u(y)− u(c))≥ (u(z)− u(c))
and thus (y)k  (z)1, according to the RDCLU SWO, is clearly consistent with c < y < z,
provided that z is sufficiently close to y and k is sufficiently large. The conclusion does
not follow from the CLU SWO either, but it follows from the AU SWO. The CLL SWO leads
even to the following more extreme version of the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion: For
all x ∈ X, x≺ (z)1 if x[1] < z. We believe that this disqualifies the CLL SWO as a satisfying
criterion.
Propositions 1 and 2 build a strong case in favor of the RDCLU SWO. It is, however,
interesting to further assess the criterion with respect to other principles proposed in
the literature on variable population criteria.
As shown in Arrhenius (forthcoming, Section 3.8), both TU and AU SWOs fail the
following principle:
An SWR  satisfies the Strong Quality Addition Principle if there are y z ∈R with y > z > 0
and k ∈N such that for all x ∈ X and n > k, (x (y)k) (x (z)n).
In contrast, this principle is satisfied by the CLL SWO and also by the CLU SWO with
c > 0 (just let y > c > z > 0, implying that (x (y)k)  (x (z)n) for all x ∈ X and kn ∈ N
according to the CLU SWO).
To show that the Strong Quality Addition Principle is satisfied by the RDCLU SWO
with c ≥ 0 (i.e., even if c = 0) is more delicate: Let y z ∈ R and k ∈ N satisfy the require-
ments that y > z > c and
1−βk
1−β (u(y)− u(c))≥
1
1−β(u(z)− u(c))
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Then clearly (x (y)k) (x (z)n) according to the RDCLU SWO for all n ∈ N if x[n(x)] ≤ z.
Moreover, with n > k, raising elements of x above z contributes more to (x (y)k) than to
(x (z)n) as their ranks are lower in the former allocation than in the latter, implying that
the strict preference cannot be reversed.
Arrhenius (forthcoming) suggests the following weak version of the Pigou–Dalton
transfer principle, which is satisfied if any given allocation is deemed worse than an
egalitarian allocation with the same number of individuals and higher average (and thus
higher total) well-being.
An SWR  satisfies the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle if, for all x ∈ X and z >
(1/n(x))
∑n(x)
r=1 x[r], x≺ (z)n(x).
This principle is satisfied by the RDCLU SWO if u satisfies β× Cu ≤ 1, where
Cu = sup
0<ε≤x≤x′
u(x′ + ε)− u(x′)
u(x)− u(x− ε)
is an index of nonconcavity of the function u.4 It is also satisfied by CLU and AU SWOs
if u is concave and, of course, by the CLL SWO.
Last, the RDCLU, CLU (if c > 0), AU, and CLL SWOs all violate the following principle:
An SWR  satisfies the Mere Addition Principle if, for all x ∈ X and z ∈R++, (x z) x.
Of the SWRs we consider, only the NDCLU SWO with c = 0 and for a restricted set of the
function f , including the TU SWO, satisfies the Mere Addition Principle. The RDCLU
SWO with c = 0 does not, because adding an individual with low positive well-being will
decrease the weights on individuals with higher well-being and might thereby worsen
the allocation.5
With the possible exception of the Mere Addition Principle, this shows that the RD-
CLU SWO has desirable properties when evaluated by the above conditions and princi-
ples. These positive conclusions are of interest in view of Arrhenius (forthcoming, Sec-
tion 11.14), where it is shown that the Weak Non-Sadism Condition is hard to satisfy
unless other desirable properties are given up.
Table 1 summarizes the different principles and conclusions satisfied by the differ-
ent SWOs discussed in this section, where the plus sign (+) denotes that the principle is
satisfied (or the conclusion follows or, in the first three lines and the sixth, the conclusion
is avoided) and the minus sign (−) denotes the opposite.
5. Optimal population size
Following Dasgupta (1988, pp. 123–125), let m be the total available amount of a con-
sumption good and, as before, let n denote the number of individuals. Let the well-being
4See the proof of Proposition 6 in Zuber and Asheim (2012).
5Indeed, adding people with positive but very low well-being may increase inequality, an objection that
is often made against the Mere Addition Principle. See, for instance, Carlson (1998), who also proves that
the Mere Addition Principle and the Non-Anti-Egalitarianism Principle imply a conclusion similar to the
Repugnant Conclusion.
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RDCLU CLU CLU AU CLL
c ≥ 0 c = 0 c > 0 c ≥ 0
Avoiding the
Repugnant Conclusion + − + + +
Avoiding the Weak
Repugnant Conclusion + − − + +
Avoiding the Very
Sadistic Conclusion + + − + +
Weak Non-Sadism
Condition +a + − − +
Negative Mere Addition
Principle + + + − +
Avoiding the Reverse
Repugnant Conclusion + + + − −
Strong Quality Addition
Principle + − + − +
Non-Anti-Egalitarianism
Principle +b +c +c +c +
Mere Addition
Principle − + − − −
aIf {u(z) :z ∈R} is bounded above.
bIf β× Cu ≤ 1.
cIf u is concave.
Table 1. Population principles and social welfare orders.
of each individual be equal to allocated consumption minus s, implying that s is the level
of consumption needed to attain neutrality. Hence, a life is worth living if consumption
exceeds s, while it is not if consumption falls below s.
Under the AU SWO, the optimal population size n is equal to 1, as this maximizes
average utility. Likewise for the CLL SWO, as this maximizes the utility of the worst-off
individual. Turn now to the CLU and RDCLU SWOs. Under the assumption that u is
concave, it is optimal to divide the available amount m equally among the n individu-
als. Hence, the so-called genesis problem is to optimize n given that each individual’s
well-being x(n) equals (m/n)− s, with n treated as a continuous variable, for tractabil-
ity. Dasgupta (2005) argues that the genesis problem might not be the most interesting
problem for population ethics. It is also different from the problem studied by Palivos
and Yip (1993) and Razin and Yuen (1995), where the development of per capita well-
being and population size is optimized within models of economic growth. Still, it is
illustrative and leads to generalizable insights (cf. Dasgupta 1988, footnote 16).
Under the CLU SWO, the genesis problem becomes
max
n
n
(
u
(
m
n
− s
)
− u(c)
)

leading to the first-order condition
u(x(n))− u(c)= (x(n)+ s)u′(x(n)) (1)
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If u(x)= (1/(1−η))(x+ s)1−η with η> 1, then (1) can be transformed to
x(n)+ s
c + s = η
1/(η−1)
As the elasticity of marginal utility η goes to infinity, η1/(η−1) goes to unity, illustrating
how the CLU SWO leads to the Repugnant Conclusion if c = 0 and to the Weak Repug-
nant Conclusion otherwise.
Under the RDCLU SWO, the genesis problem becomes
max
n
1−βn
1−β
(
u
(
m
n
− s
)
− u(c)
)

leading to the first-order condition
γ(nβ)
(
u(x(n))− u(c))= (x(n)+ s)u′(x(n)) (2)
where
γ(nβ) := β
n(− lnβn)
1−βn
can be shown to satisfy 0< γ(nβ) < 1, ∂γ/∂n < 0, ∂γ/∂β > 0, and limβ→1 γ(nβ) = 1. If
u(x)= (1/(1−η))(x+ s)1−η with η> 1, then (2) can be transformed to
x(n)+ s
c + s =
(
γ(nβ)+η− 1
γ(nβ)
)1/(η−1)

The left-hand side (l.h.s.) is a decreasing function of n that equals 1 for n=m/(c+ s) and
approaches ∞ as n ↓ 0. The right-hand side (r.h.s.) is greater than η1/(η−1) > 1 and an
increasing function of n—implying that the first-order condition determines a unique
optimal value of n—and a decreasing function of β that approaches η1/(η−1) as β→ 1—
implying that this optimal population size is lower under the RDCLU SWO than under
the CLU SWO. Thus, this analysis illustrates how the RDCLU SWO leads to an escape
from the Repugnant Conclusion.
6. Concluding remarks
We have contributed to population ethics by proposing and axiomatizing the rank-
discounted critical-level generalized utilitarian (RDCLU) SWO. By doing so we have
taken one step toward preparing the rank-discounted utilitarian criterion (see Zuber
and Asheim 2012) for practical use.
First of all, we have generalized rank-discounted utilitarianism by letting individ-
uals rather than generations be the object of analysis. This generalization has several
implications, one of which is particularly interesting to point out: If there is no intra-
generational inequality and per capita well-being increases over time, then the aggre-
gate marginal utility of a generation increases with the number of individuals belonging
to this generation. On the other hand, the average rank-dependent discount rate with
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which this aggregate marginal utility is discounted between this generation and its im-
mediate predecessor increases with its size.
Second, we have allowed for analysis of a situation where population changes en-
dogenously, e.g., as a consequence of climate change. By introducing a critical level
that if experienced by an added individual without changing the utilities of the existing
population leads to an alternative that is as good as the original only if the well-being
levels of the existing population do not exceed the critical level, we have been able to
combine critical-level population ethics with rank-discounted utilitarianism in an ap-
pealing manner. In particular, the RDCLU SWO offers an escape from the Repugnant
and Very Sadistic Conclusions.
However, practical application of the rank-discounted utilitarian criterion also re-
quires explicit treatment of risk. This is the topic of Asheim and Zuber (2014).
Appendix: Proofs
We first prove the representation result by showing that statements (i) and (ii) of The-
orem 1 are equivalent. It is straightforward to show that an RDCLU SWO satisfies Ax-
ioms 1–7, so that statement (ii) implies statement (i). Hence, to prove Theorem 1, we
need to show that statement (i) implies statement (ii); that is, that an SWR  on X satis-
fying Axioms 1–7 is an RDCLU SWO. This is shown by means of Lemmas 1–4.
We define the restrictionn of to Rn in the following way: for all xy ∈Rn, xn y if
and only if x y. We begin by establishing a representation result for sets of allocations
with the same finite population size.
Lemma 1. If the SWR  satisfies Axioms 1–5, then there exist β ∈ R++ and a continuous
increasing function u :R→R such that for all n ∈N and xy ∈Rn,
xn y ⇔
n∑
r=1
βru(x[r])≥
n∑
r=1
βru(y[r]) (A.1)
Proof. For any n ≥ 3, we show that the relation n satisfies the following properties
proposed by Ebert (1988): continuous order, monotonicity, symmetry, and indepen-
dence with respect to ordered vectors. By Ebert (1988, Theorem 1), this implies that
there exist continuous increasing functions unr such that for all n ∈N and xy ∈Rn,
xn y ⇔
n∑
r=1
unr (x[r])≥
n∑
r=1
unr (y[r]) (A.2)
The fact that n is a continuous order follows from Axioms 1 and 2. The fact that
it satisfies monotonicity and symmetry follows from Axiom 3. For the independence
condition, we can apply Gorman’s (1968) theorem on the ordered set {x ∈ Rn :x(1) ≤
· · · ≤ x(n)}. By Axiom 4, we know that all sets {12     t} for 1< t < n are separable. By
Axiom 5, we know that all sets {t t + 1     n} for 1 < t < n are separable. By intersec-
tions of such separable subsets, we can obtain any subsets {t t + 1}, 1≤ t < n, which are
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therefore separable by Gorman’s (1968) theorem. By unions of such subsets, we can ob-
tain any subset of indices in {1     n} so that they are also separable by Gorman’s (1968)
theorem. This corresponds to Ebert’s (1988) Independence with Respect to Ordered Vec-
tors. We may set unr (0)= 0 for all r ≤ n; this normalization can be performed without loss
of generality because it leaves the ranking unchanged.
Now, representation (A.2) exists forn whatever n ∈N. Furthermore, by Axiom 4, we
have the following equivalences (for z ≥ {x[n] y[n]}):
n∑
r=1
unr (x[r])≥
n∑
r=1
unr (y[r]) ⇔ xn y
⇔ (x z)n+1 (y z)
⇔
n∑
r=1
un+1r (x[r])+ un+1n+1(z)≥
n∑
r=1
un+1r (y[r])+ un+1n+1(z)
By standard uniqueness results for additive functions on rank-ordered sets, we can take
(after the appropriate normalization) unr ≡ un+1r . We can henceforth drop the superscript
n in functions unr .
By Axiom 5, we have the following equivalences (for z ≤min{x[n] y[n]}):
n∑
r=1
ur(x[r])≥
n∑
r=1
ur(y[r]) ⇔ xn y
⇔ (x z)n+1 (y z)
⇔
n∑
r=1
ur+1(x[r])+ u1(z)≥
n∑
r=1
ur+1(y[r])+ u1(z)
By the cardinality of the additive representation and the normalization condition, there
must exist a β> 0 such that ur+1(y)= βur(y) for any y ∈R. Note that β does not depend
on r. We obtain (A.1), where u≡ u1 is a continuous increasing function from R to R.
By Axiom 4, the proof can be extended to the case where n= 1 or n= 2. 
Let c ∈ R+ be the critical-level parameter introduced in Axiom 6. Define Xc as the
nonempty set {x ∈ X :x[ ] ≤ (c)n(x)} of finite allocations where well-being does not ex-
ceed c. We obtain a representation result for finite allocations (with variable population)
where well-being does not exceed c.
Lemma 2. If the SWR  satisfies Axioms 1–6 and c ∈ R+ is the critical-level parameter of
Axiom 6, then there exist β ∈ R++ and a continuous increasing function u :R → R such
that, for all xy ∈ Xc ,
x y ⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βr(u(y[r])− u(c))
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Proof. Assume that xy ∈ Xc and n(x)≤ n(y), and let k= n(y)− n(x). Then
x y ⇔ (x (c)k)n(y) y
⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βru(x[r])+
n(y)∑
r=n(x)+1
βru(c)≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βru(y[r])
⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βru(x[r])+
n(y)∑
r=n(x)+1
βru(c)−
n(y)∑
r=1
βru(c)≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βru(y[r])−
n(y)∑
r=1
βru(c)
⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βr(u(y[r])− u(c))
since x∼ (x (c)k) by k applications of Axiom 6, using Axiom 5 repeatedly to ensure that
the allocation is in Rn when Axiom 6 is applied. 
The following lemma shows that adding Axiom 7 implies that the rank utility dis-
count factor, β, is smaller than 1.
Lemma 3. If the SWR  satisfies Axioms 1–7 and c ∈ R+ is the critical-level parameter of
Axiom 6, then there exist 0< β < 1 and a continuous increasing function u :R→ R such
that for all xy ∈ Xc ,
x y ⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βr(u(y[r])− u(c))
Proof. Let x y ∈ R satisfy that c ≥ x > y and let k ∈ N. Assume that there exist z ∈ R
and  ∈ N such that (x)k  (z)  (y)k (note that z < c, because otherwise, by Axioms 1,
3, and 6, (z)  (c) ∼ (c)k  (x)k, a contradiction). By Lemma 2, this means that (for
β = 1; the case β= 1 can be treated similarly)
βk − 1
β− 1 (u(x)− u(c)) >
β − 1
β− 1 (u(z)− u(c)) >
βk − 1
β− 1 (u(y)− u(c))
When β> 1, lim→∞(β − 1)/(β− 1)= ∞ so that
lim
→∞
β − 1
β− 1 (u(z)− u(c))= −∞
Hence there exists N >  such that
βn − 1
β− 1 (u(z)− u(c)) <
βn(x) − 1
β− 1 (u(y)− u(c))
for all n≥N , a contradiction of Axiom 7. 
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Finally, we extend the representation to the entire domain X of all finite allocations
by showing that any finite allocation x can be made as bad as an allocation where all
individuals are at the critical level c by adding sufficiently many people at a low well-
being level z, and thus indifferent to an egalitarian allocation where each individual’s
well-being equals x ≤ c. This allows us to combine the representations of Lemmas 1
and 2, and shows that statement (i) of Theorem 1 implies statement (ii).
Lemma 4. If the SWR  satisfies Axioms 1–7, then there exist 0<β< 1 and a continuous
increasing function u :R→R such that for all xy ∈ X,
x y ⇔
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βr(u(y[r])− u(c))
Proof. Step 1: For any n ∈ N, x ∈ Rn, and z ∈ R satisfying z ≤ x[1] and z < c, there exists
k(x) such that for all k≥ k(x), (x (z)k)≺ (c)n+k.
By Lemma 3, we know that β < 1 in the representation on Xc . By Lemma 1, the
property extends to Rn for any n ∈N.
For any x ∈ Rn, the n-equally distributed equivalent of x, denoted en(x), is the real
number x ∈R such that (x)n ∼n x. Axioms 1–3 imply that en :Rn →R is well defined. By
Lemma 1 and since Axioms 1–5 hold, it is defined as
en(x)= u−1
(
1−β
1−βn
n∑
r=1
βr−1u(x[r])
)

Now let z ≤ x[1] and z < c. We obtain the expression
en+k(x (z)k) = u−1
(
1−β
1−βn+k
(
k∑
r=1
βr−1u(z)+
n+k∑
r=k+1
βr−1u(x[r])
))
= u−1
(
1−βk
1−βn+k u(z)+
βk −βn+k
1−βn+k ·
1−β
1−βn
n∑
r=1
βr−1u(x[r])
)

If x[n] ≤ c, then en+k(x (z)k)≤ c for all k ∈N and Step 1 is completed. Therefore, assume
x[n] > c, which, since z ≤ x[1] and z < c, implies that z < en(x).
Write ak := (1−βk)/(1−βn+k); because 0<β< 1, (ak)k∈N is an increasing sequence
converging to 1. Since z < en(x) and
en+k(x (z)k)= u−1
(
aku(z)+ (1− ak)u(en(x))
)

it follows that en+k+1(x (z)k+1) < en+k(x (z)k) and en+k(x (z)k) tends to z whenk tends
to infinity. As z < c, we deduce that for any n ∈ N and x ∈ Rn, there exists k(x) ∈ N such
that for any k≥ k(x), en+k(x (z)k) < c.
Step 2: For any xy ∈ X, choose zwith z ≤min{x[1] y[1]} and z < c, =max{k(x)k(y)},
x = en(x)+(x (z)), and y = en(y)+(y (z)), and use (x (z)) ∼ (x)n(x)+, (y (z)) ∼
(y)n(y)+ and (x)n(x)+, (y)n(y)+ ∈ Xc to establish the result.
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Using the above definitions of x and y, we obtain the following equivalences by re-
peated applications of Axiom 5 and Lemma 2:
x y ⇔ (x)n(x)+ ∼ (x (z)) (y (z))∼ (y)n(y)+
⇔
n(x)+∑
r=1
βr(u(x)− u(c))≥
n(y)+∑
r=1
βr(u(y)− u(c))
However, by Lemma 1,
n(x)+∑
r=1
βru(x) =
∑
r=1
βru(z)+β
n(x)∑
r=1
βru(x[r])
n(y)+∑
r=1
βru(y) =
∑
r=1
βru(z)+β
n(y)∑
r=1
βru(y[r])
using the fact (x)n(x)+ ∼ (x (z)) and (y)n(y)+ ∼ (y (z)). We obtain that
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))≥
n(y)∑
r=1
βr(u(y[r])− u(c))
if and only if x y by combining these result and rearranging terms. 
Next, we provide a proof of Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Assume that xy ∈ X, and u is a continuous and increasing
function.
Part (i). This part follows directly from the observation that on the domain (01],∑n(x)
r=1 β
r(u(x[r])− u(c)) is a continuous function of β.
Part (ii). Since Lc is complete, it is sufficient to show that x ∼Lc y implies the ex-
istence of β ∈ (01) such that x ∼βuc y for all β ∈ (0β), and that x Lc y implies the
existence of β ∈ (01) such that xβuc y for all β ∈ (0β).
x ∼Lc y implies the existence of β ∈ (01) such that x ∼βuc y for all β ∈ (0β).
Let n(x) ≥ n(y). By Definition 5, (x[1]     x[n(y)]) = y[ ] and (x[n(x)+1]     x[n(y)]) =
(c)n(x)−n(y). By Definition 1, x∼βuc y for all β ∈ (01).
x Lc y implies the existence of β ∈ (01) such that x βuc y for all β ∈ (0β). Let
x = min{x[1] c} and y = max{y[n(y)] c}. Note that x ≤ y. If x = y and x Lc y, then by
Definitions 1 and 5, x βuc y for all β ∈ (01). Hence, only the case where x < y
remains. By Definition 5, there are three cases. Case 1: There exists R ∈ {1     n}
such that x[r] = y[r] for all r ∈ {1    R − 1} and x[R] > y[R], where n := min{n(x)n(y)}.
In this case, let x′ = x[R] and y ′ = y[R]. Case 2: n(x) > n(y), (x[1]     x[n(y)]) = y[ ],
and (x[n(y)+1]     x[n(x)]) > (c)n(x)−n(y). In this case, let x′ = x[R] and y ′ = c, where
R := min{r > n(y) : x[r] > c}. Case 3: n(x) < n(y), x[ ] = (y[1]     y[n(x)]), and c > y[n(x)+1].
In this case, let x′ = c and y ′ = y[n(x)+1]. Note that in all three cases, x′ > y ′. Define β by
(1−β)u(x′)+βu(x)= (1−β)u(y ′)+βu(y)
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Then, by applying the affine transformation
1−β
β
(
n(x)∑
r=1
βr(u(x[r])− u(c))
)
+ u(c)= (1−β)
n(x)∑
r=1
βr−1u(x[r])+βn(x)u(c)
it follows from Definition 1 that xβuc y for all β ∈ (0β). 
Finally, we provide proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (i). Consider anNDCLUSWO such that c > 0. Assume
that satisfies the Weak Non-Sadism Condition: there exist y ∈R−− and k ∈N such that
for all x ∈ X, z ∈R++, and n ∈N, (x (y)k) (x (z)n). Consider any v > c > z > 0. Choose
 ∈N such that6
f (+ k)
(

+ k(u(v)− u(c))+
k
+ k(u(y)− u(c))
)
> 0 (A.3)
It also possible to find n ∈N such that7
f (+ n)
(

+ n(u(v)− u(c))+
n
+ n(u(z)− u(c))
)
< 0 (A.4)
By Definition 4, (A.3) and (A.4) imply that ((v) (y)k)  ((v) (z)n), which is a
contradiction.
Consider an NDCLU SWO  such that c = 0. If the function f is not bounded
above, then for all y > z > 0 and k ∈ N, there is n > k such that f (k)(u(y) − u(0)) <
f(n)(u(z)− u(0)). Hence, by Definition 4, (y)k ≺ (z)n, which is the Repugnant Conclu-
sion. Therefore, assume that the function f is bounded above. Assume furthermore that
 satisfies the Weak Non-Sadism Condition: there exist y ∈R−− and k ∈N such that for
all x ∈ X, z ∈R++, and n ∈N, (x (y)k) (x (z)n). For v > 0, choose like above  ∈N such
that
f (+ k)
(

+ k(u(v)− u(0))+
k
+ k(u(y)− u(0))
)
> 0 (A.5)
Denote the left-hand side by M . Because f is bounded above and u is continuous and
increasing, there is z > 0 such that f (n)(u(z) − u(0)) < M for all n ∈ N. Hence, by the
same reasoning as above, there exists n ∈N such that
f (+ n)
(

+ n(u(v)− u(0))+
n
+ n(u(z)− u(0))
)
<M (A.6)
By Definition 4, (A.5) and (A.6) imply that ((v) (y)k)  ((v) (z)n), which is a
contradiction.
6There necessarily exists such an  ∈ N because f ( + k) > 0 and (/( + k))(u(v) − u(c)) +
(k/(+ k))(u(y)− u(c)) is arbitrarily close to u(v)− u(c) > 0 for large values of .
7There necessarily exists such an n ∈ N because f ( + n) > 0 and (/( + n))(u(v) − u(c)) +
(n/(+ n))(u(z)− u(c)) is arbitrarily close to u(z)− u(c) < 0 for large values of n.
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The arguments of part (i) hold even if the function u is bounded above.
Part (ii). An RDCLU SWO  avoids the Weak Repugnant Conclusion. If y > z > c,
then there exists k ∈N determined by the requirement that
1−βk
1−β (u(y)− u(c))≥
1
1−β(u(z)− u(c))
implying that (y)k  (z)n for all n ∈ N according to the RDCLU SWO (cf. Definition 1).
This holds even if the function u is bounded above.
An RDCLU SWO  satisfies the Weak Non-Sadism Condition if the function u is
bounded above. Let u¯ := sup{u(x) :x ∈R}, and choose y ∈R−− and k ∈N such that
1−βk
1−β (u(y)− u(0))+
βk
1−β(u¯− u(0))≤ 0 (A.7)
Then it follows from the fact that u¯ ≥ u(c) ≥ u(0) that for any initial allocation x ∈ X
where all individuals have positive lifetime well-being, (x (y)k) ≺ (x (z)n) for all
z ∈R++ and n ∈N. This obtains since (A.7) implies
1−βk
1−β (u(y)− u(c))+
βk
1−β(u¯− u(c))≤
1
1−β(u(0)− u(c))
where the r.h.s. is smaller than the welfare of any allocation where all individuals have
positive well-being. Including individuals in x with well-being at or below y does not
change the ranking, while including individuals in x at y and then raising their well-
being toward 0 contributes less to (x (y)k) than to (x (z)n) since their rank is higher in
the former allocation than in the latter. Hence, for any initial allocation x ∈ X, (x (y)k)
(x (z)n), showing that an RDCLU SWO satisfies the Weak Non-Sadism Condition if the
function u is bounded above. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Part (i). Consider an NDCLU SWO  such that the function
f is bounded above. If, for some n ∈ N, f (n) > f(n + 1), then Definition 4 implies that
for any z ∈ R−−, (z)n ≺ (z)n+1, so that the Negative Mere Addition Principle is not satis-
fied. Therefore, assume that f is nondecreasing. Let y < z < 0. If there exist n ∈ N and
k ∈ N such that ((y)n (z)k)  (y)n, then by completeness and transitivity of an NDCLU
SWO, there must exist 0 ≤  < k such that ((z)n (y)+1)  ((z)n (y)), a violation of the
Negative Mere Addition Principle. Hence, to establish a violation of the Negative Mere
Addition Principle, it is sufficient to show that there exist n ∈ N and k ∈ N such that
((y)n (z)k) (y)n or, equivalently, by Definition 4,
f (n)
f (n+ k) >
n
n+k(u(c)− u(y))+ kn+k(u(c)− u(z))
u(c)− u(y)  (A.8)
For sufficiently small ε > 0, there is n ∈N such that
f (n)
f (n+ k) ≥
u(c)− u(z)
u(c)− u(y) + ε
Theoretical Economics 9 (2014) Rank-discounted utilitarianism 649
for all k ∈ N, since any nondecreasing bounded sequence converges and u(y) < u(z) <
u(c). The result follows since the numerator of the right-hand side of (A.8) is arbitrarily
close to u(c)− u(z) for large values of k.
Consider an NDCLU SWO  such that the function f is not bounded above. If c > 0,
then for all z ∈ R++ with z < c, f (n)(u(z) − u(c)) tends to minus infinity when n goes
to infinity. Therefore, by Definition 4, for any x ∈ X there exists n ∈ N such that x (z)n,
which is the Very Sadistic Conclusion. If, on the other hand, c = 0, then for all z ∈ R++,
f (n)u(z) tends to infinity when n goes to infinity. Hence, by Definition 4, for all y ∈R++
with y > z > 0 and k ∈ N, there is n > k such that (y)k ≺ (z)n, which is the Repugnant
Conclusion.
Part (ii). An RDCLU SWO  avoids the Repugnant Conclusion. By Proposition 1(ii),
any RDCLU SWO avoids the Weak Repugnant Conclusion and therefore avoids the Re-
pugnant Conclusion.
An RDCLU SWO  avoids the Very Sadistic Conclusion. Choose y ∈ R−− and k ∈ N
such that (1 − βk)(u(y) − u(c)) ≤ u(0) − u(c) ≤ (1 − βn)(u(0) − u(c)) for all n ∈ N. By
Definition 1, (y)k  (0)n ≺ (z)n for all z ∈ R++ and n ∈ N. Thus an RDCLU SWO avoids
the Very Sadistic Conclusion.
An RDCLU SWO satisfies the Negative Mere Addition Principle. This follows since c
is a lower bound for the context-dependent critical level for . 
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